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The paper maps the dollarization process in Vietnam since the beginning 1990s. We 
analyze the pros and cons of complete currency substitution. We discuss different forms and 
degrees of dollarization, and why some countries dollarized and others not. Further, the paper 
analyzes the case of partial dollarization, its implied risks for financial sector stability and the 
underlying dynamics of dollarization. Finally, we describe ways to reverse dollarization. The 
main conclusions are that dollarization is not a viable exchange rate regime option for Vietnam; 
furthermore, the current status of a partly dollarized economy poses considerable risks for 
financial sector stability and makes the country prone to exogenous shocks. The recent 
dollarization of banks’ loan portfolio has considerably increased systemic risk. The foreseeable 
opening of the Vietnamese economy will significantly increase the risks related to dollarization. 
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Introduction 
The paper discusses dollarization in Vietnam. It starts with a debate of the pros and cons 
of so-called corner solutions for exchange rate regimes, pure float or a fix, particularly currency 
substitution, by drawing from existing literature. By applying the criteria developed in the debate 
about dollarization it becomes very clear that Vietnam does not qualify as a candidate for 
currency substitution. 
In the following section we discuss different forms and definitions of dollarization. We 
identify Vietnam as a partly dollarized economy, characterized by a dual monetary system that 
significantly complicates monetary policy. In the third section we analyze why economies are 
dollarized and others are not. The common obstacle for emerging economies is their inability to 
borrow internationally in domestic currency due to a perceived weakness of its currency and 
structure of the economy. Applying our definition, basically all emerging economies are 
dollarized; some indirectly, others directly. Vietnam is identified as a directly dollarized 
economy with a dual monetary standard. The U.S. dollar serves as parallel currency and quasi 
second legal tender. The fourth section demonstrates that dollarization does not cure the 
underlying problem identified in the previous section. Contrary, the use of dollar as a substitute 
for domestic currency produces major risks, original sin and currency mismatch. We find that 
directly, partly dollarized economies are potentially instable and extremely prone to financial 
crises. The final section discusses possible ways and a gradual approach for Vietnam to reduce 
and finally abolish dollarization of its economy. 
1. The Pros and Cons of Dollarization 
Since the Asian financial and banking crises in 1997 a significant shift in the debate 
about appropriate exchange rate regimes for emerging economies has taken place. In a world of 
huge and highly volatile international capital flows an adjustable exchange rate peg with an 
international key currency – in Asia the U.S. dollar – is no longer seen as a viable option. A peg 
with low exit cost is exposed to speculative attacks with the consequences of a dramatic reverse 
of capital flows, exchange rate deterioration and financial sector destabilization.
4  
                                                 
4 Certainly the significant accumulation of foreign exchange reserves by regional central bank is another reaction to 
those experiences in 1997 and after.   3
For the proponents of the new exchange rate paradigm the only credible shelter against 
exchange rate speculation is a corner solution, either a free float of the exchange rate following 
supply and demand in the foreign exchange market, or a credible if not irrevocable fix of the 
exchange rate, the introduction of a currency board or complete currency substitution – 
dollarization.
5 The advantage of a floating regime is that it removes one-way bets: any short 
selling of domestic currency bears the risk of a market turning in the opposite direction.  
However, not many countries allow their exchange rates to purely float. Edwards (2002) 
stresses the fact that emerging countries tend to export commodities and light manufactures, 
making them vulnerable to exchange rate volatility. For a small open economy the exchange rate 
is not only crucial for determining the competitiveness of exports; the exchange rate is also an 
important asset price. The lack of credibility of domestic monetary authorities and repeated 
devaluation result in a high risk premium on the domestic currency. High exchange rate volatility 
causes significant pass-through effects on domestic prices and might destabilize the financial 
sector (Calvo and Reinhart, 2001).
6 The nominal exchange rate peg serves as nominal anchor of 
the economy; only a few countries were able to substitute this external anchor through a 
domestic one by targeting inflation and allow their currency to float. In reality, a pure floating 
regime is rather an achievement then a choice. 
On the other hand, the corner solutions of a currency board and dollarization imply the 
abolishment of the institution Central Bank; either through the replacement by a currency board, 
a currency exchange mechanism simulating the rules of the game of the classical gold standard, 
or by entirely subordinating domestic monetary policy under the reign of the central bank that 
provides the international key currency. The potential merits of this type of regimes are twofold; 
through the abolishment of the central bank its abuse by opportunistic politicians enforcing the 
use of the printing press is ruled out; in addition, the rule of the games of the gold standard, 
although gold is replaced by the dollar (and in some cases by the euro), enforces internal 
adjustment processes towards external equilibrium. In other words, the degree of freedom having 
                                                 
5 See for example Dornbusch, R. (2001), Eichengreen, B. (2001), Hausmann, R. (1999). 
6 Throughout the paper risk premium is used for exchange rate risk while country risk stands for default risk.    4
a domestic monetary policy is given away. Finally, currency board and currency substitution 
bear huge exit costs; these huge costs increase the credibility and sustainability of the fix.
7 
Dornbusch (2001) describes the loss of domestic monetary policy as irrelevant, because 
by replacing domestic currency through dollars the currency) risk premium will disappear. This 
allows a low level of interest rates that could never be achieved with the domestic currency and 
the risk premium that comes with it. The lower level of interest rates translates into a more 
dynamic economic performance to the benefit of all; under these circumstances financial sector 
development will most likely accelerate.
8 
However, the list of arguments against dollarization is long; first of all, with the exchange 
rate the economy looses an important adjustment mechanism, especially in cases of external 
shocks. Severe swings in output and employment due to asymmetric shocks can only be avoided 
through other domestic adjustment mechanisms, particularly wage flexibility and the fiscal 
policy.  
Further, the dollarized economy looses the lender of last resort function; in cases of 
liquidity needs of banks or possible bank panics the authorities don’t have furthermore the ability 
to inject theoretically unlimited amounts of money. In other words, the money supply function 
becomes inelastic, systemic risk in the financial sector increases.
9  
Powell and Sturzenegger (2000) challenge the benefit of lower interest rates stressed by 
Dornbusch as a byproduct of currency substitution. With the abolishment of the central bank the 
country loses two important sources of revenues, seignorage and inflation tax. This shortfall in 
revenues increases default risk. The risk premium might not disappear but rather change its form; 
the abolishment of currency risk is offset by an increased default (country) risk premium and 
interest rate levels stay significantly higher than in the US (the benchmark). 
A main challenge for advocates of fixing regimes is the debate about optimal currency 
areas. Similar economic structures and a high degree of factor mobility (capital and labor) are 
                                                 
7 Argentina is not a good counter-example as the abolishment of the currency board was followed by a dramatic 
meltdown of wealth, in particular if measured in dollars. 
8 Winkler, A. (2004) offers a very good compilation of the main pros and cons for dollarization, p. 7. See also 
Fratianni, M. and A. Hauskrecht (2002). 
9 The Argentine experiences after December 2001 have sufficiently demonstrated that credit lines with international 
banks to not effectively substitute the ability to print money.   5
identified as crucial preconditions for a monetary unification. For many dollarized economies 
though these are not given. Rose (2000 and 2002) published astonishing econometric estimates 
on prospective trade gains for monetary unions. His empirical work shows dramatic increases of 
intra-trade after monetary unions were formed. The endogeniety argument questions the 
relevance of concerns about optimal currency area considerations for dollarized economies.  
In his empirical work on officially dollarized economies Edwards (2001 and 2003) finds 
lower inflation than in countries with domestic currency but also a lower growth rate of GDP and 
higher output volatility. 
Equally important is the intensity of trade of the dollarized economy with the US 
(Euroland). If a country uses country A’s currency as substitute and has considerable trade with 
countries B and C, while exchange rates of countries A/B, A/C, and B/C float, this might 
produce hazardous cross-rate effects for country A’s international competitiveness and balance 
of payments equilibrium.  
To sum up the above arguments, dollarization might be a productive solution for rather 
small, open economies having close trade and financial ties with the country providing the 
anchor (substituting) currency. Otherwise, severe cross-rate effects might impede the supposed 
benefits of enthroning an international key currency as a substitute for domestic money. Winkler 
(2004, p. 6) states: “…recommending dollarization/eurozation irrespective of countries’ ex ante 
degree of integration with the potential anchor country seems to bear considerable risk”.  
   6
Table 1: Viet Nam's Major Trading Partners
2002 (est) 2002 (est) 2002 (est) 10m03
Total year 16,705.8          19,733.0         36,438.8         
in mio. USD Export Import Total Trade in % Export Import Total Trade in %
1 Japan 2,438.1            2,509.6           4,947.7            0.19 2354.3 2495 4,849.3              0.18
2 PR China 1,495.5            2,158.8           3,654.3            0.14 1331.5 2,496.1        3,827.6              0.14
3 Singapore 960.7               2,534.3           3,495.0            0.13 860.1 2,335.2        3,195.3              0.12
4T a i w a n 8 1 2 . 1               2,536.9           3,349.0            0.13 607.6 2,317.5        2,925.1              0.11
5 USA 2,421.1            457.5              2,878.6            0.11 3401.5 1,030.0        4,431.5              0.17
6S .  K o r e a 4 6 6 . 0               2,285.5           2,751.5            0.10 397.9 2,128.0        2,525.9              0.09
7 Australia 1,329.0            286.3              1,615.3            0.06 1159.5 221.9           1,381.4              0.05
8 Germany 720.7               558.3              1,279.0            0.05 674.9 479.9           1,154.8              0.04
9 Thailand 227.8               955.5              1,183.3            0.04 285.2 1,030.7        1,315.9              0.05
10 Hongkong 337.3               809.6              1,146.9            0.04 306.9 817.6           1,124.5              0.04
SUM 10 Countries 26,300.6         1.00 26,731.3           1.00
Source: General Statistics Office  
Given this catalogue of prerequisites, Vietnam obviously does not qualify as a candidate 
for beneficial dollarization. Huge differences in wealth and economic structure, and low labor 
and capital market integration with the US conflict with major OCA criteria. In addition, while 
dollar is the preferred international key currency in Vietnamese balances, not euro and also not 
yen, Vietnam has a much diversified trade with the rest of the world. While trade with US is 
increasing rapidly, trade with other Asian countries, particularly Japan, and also Europe is 
important (see table 1). Also financial integration with the rest of Asia is significant. Hence, 
dollarization is not a viable exchange rate regime option for Vietnam.  
2. Forms of Dollarization 
McKinnon (1997, p. 367) differentiates between direct and indirect dollarization. 
Indirect dollarization “refers to investors switching between non-monetary financial assets, say 
“bonds”, denominated in different currencies in a way that indirectly influences the domestic 
demand for transaction balances”. Direct currency substitution refers to a foreign currency 
having money function within the domestic economy. Obviously the degree of dollarization, 
qualitatively and quantitatively, is varying from country to country. A number of countries has 
abandoned their domestic currencies and replaced them with foreign currency.    7
Officially dollarized Panama and more recently Ecuador and El Salvador are prominent 
examples of officially dollarized economies. Several other smaller economies have chosen to 
substitute domestic currency by using dollars or euros (see table 2).
10 In all cases the dollarized 
country announced unilaterally the redemption of domestic currency and declared the U.S. dollar 
as sole legal tender. In most but not all cases the institution central bank is abolished.
11 
As table 2 demonstrates, in terms of population most countries with complete currency 
substitution are rather small. Indeed, Ecuador is now, in terms of population, the biggest 
dollarized economy. U.S. dollar, euro, and ZAR are the dominant substituting currencies. 
However, a more significant number of countries are unofficially dollarized (see table 3). 
In these cases dollars are used as unit of account, means of exchange, store of value, and medium 
of deferred payment, while the domestic currency still exists and circulates. The dollar functions 
as a quasi second legal tender of the economy, as a parallel currency. Amongst this group of 
countries the degree of dollarization might be almost complete (Bolivia, Uruguay, Lebanon) or 
only partly, as Vietnam with slightly above 20 percent of overall bank deposits.  
 
                                                 
10 Dollar and euro are the international key currencies, while no country ever introduced the yen or even pegged its 
currency directly to the yen. Most recently, El Salvador and East Timor have officially dollarized while Montenegro 
and Kosovo introduced the euro. See also Winkler, A. (2004), p. 4.  
11 Ecuador kept its central bank, although its tasks resemble more of a research institution than a central bank.   8
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El Salvador 6,400,000 Niue (1974,NZD)
Total 23,199,462 Total
Palau (1994) 19,092 Nauru (1968, AUD)
Ecuador (2000) 12,900,000 Tuvalu (1978,AUD)
Micronesia, Fed.States (1 134,597 Kiribati (1979,AUD)
Marshall Islands (1986) 70,882 Liechtenstein (1806,CHF
Barbados (1966) 275,330 Namibia (1990,ZAR)
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Panama (1903) 2,845,647 Lesotho (1996,ZAR)
Bahamas (1973) 297,852 Bhutan (1949, INR)
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Turks and Caicos Is. 18,122 St. Helena (GBP)
Falkland Is. (GBP)
Bermuda 63,503 Gibraltar (GBP)
Bristish Virgin Is. 20,812 Cook Islands (NZD)
Northern Mariana Is. 74,612 Greenland (DKK)
American Samoa 67,084 The Faroes (DKK)
Guam 157,557 Isle of Man (GBP)
Virgin Islands (U.S.) 122,211 Guernsey (GBP)
(dependent territories)
Puerto Rico 3,937,316 Jersey (GBP)
Dollarised countries Population Other cases of official
(dependent territories) foreign currency adoption
 
Source: Winkler, A. (2004), Fratianni, M. (2004) 
 Table 3:  Unofficial dollarization/euroization in selected countries 
Degree of unofficial          
dollarization/euroization  Countries       
High(>70%)  Bolivia,  Uruguay,  Lebanon, 
Middle(>20%, <70%)  Cambodia, Bulgaria,  Belarus, 
   Angola,  Costa Rica,  Russia, 
   Lao PRD  Philippines,  Vietnam, 
   Nicaragua, Zambia,  Ecuador, 
   Croatia,  Georgia,  Tajikistan, 
   Peru,  Mozambique,  Egypt, 
   Argentina,  Lithuania,  Mongolia, 
   Turkey, 
Sao Tome & 
Principe,  Moldova, 
   Paraguay,  Azerbaijan,  Honduras,
   Romania,  Latvia,  Ukraine, 
  
Guinea-
Bissau,  Congo,DR  Yemen 
   Armenia       
Source: Winkler, A et al. (2004)     
 
Please note that countries listed in table 3 are all directly dollarized/euroized; if we would 
add also indirect dollarization, basically all emerging economies had to be added to the list. This 
indicates a systemic development problem for those economies that will we addressed in the 
subsequent section.  
Vietnam is a partly dollarized economy with a dual monetary system. The precise degree 
of dollarization, however, is hard to determine. Typically, the degree of dollarization is measured 
by the ratio of foreign deposits to total bank deposits. This measure has two pitfalls. First, it 
excludes foreign currency outside the banking system. Following McKinnon, foreign currency 
covers all money functions, unit of account, medium of exchange, and medium of deferred 
payment. For an emerging economy with undeveloped financial markets, dollar currency 
holdings may represent a very large share of foreign currency money holdings. Unfortunately, 
estimates of its size and evolution are usually of poor quality. Hence, for the perspective of a 
central bank dollarization complicates the business of liquidity management.
12 
                                                 
12 The argument does not only apply for the unknown variable foreign currency in circulation and its change, but 
also because domestic and foreign currency presumably will have different velocities. So the Fisher identity changes 
into (MVND * VVND) + (M$ * V$) = y * P, where part of M$ is unknown. Not only the current value of V$ is 
unknown but also its future rate of change, in fact even the sign of change. This significantly complicates liquidity 
management as important components of the money demand function are unknown.   10
Secondly, it excludes foreign-currency borrowings abroad. A more comprehensive 
measure of dollarization, however, must also include these borrowings.  
3. Causes of Dollarization 
The literature identifies two main causes for dollarization. First, loss of credibility of 
monetary policy due to longer periods of high and volatile inflation rates and a depreciating 
exchange rate cause the risk premium on nominal assets in this particular currency to increase. 
The public shifts nominal assets into another more stable currency or into real assets, in Vietnam 
historically gold and since the mid of the 1980s increasingly U.S. dollars. Secondly, low level of 
savings in domestic currency denominated assets and relatively low maturity of those assets 
(deposits/bonds) motivate borrowing abroad in foreign currency as substitute and cause a 
dollarization of liabilities. Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003, p. 3) describe this as “the 
original sin”: “the inability of a country to borrow abroad in its own currency”.
13 This addresses 
the observation of international capital flows being pro-cyclical in their nature; capital inflows 
tend to dry out when needed to smooth the shockwaves of an external shock on consumption and 
overflow when a sufficient supply of capital is given. The risk of the original sin is a rapid 
outflow of capital that causes a sharp depreciation of the real exchange rate and makes it more 
difficult to service foreign debt. Eichengreen et al. continue (2003, p. 4): “Knowing that shocks 
affecting the real exchange rate can disrupt the country’s ability to service its debt, foreigners 
may be rendered less willing to lend. And since the real exchange rate tends to strengthen in 
good times and weaken in bad times, foreign currency debt will be harder to service in bad 
times…”
14 
As we shall see later, original sin and currency mismatch are similar but not identical 
phenomena. Borrowing in foreign currency does not necessarily cause a currency mismatch. For 
instance, the central bank might increase its net foreign reserves and thereby indirectly hedge 
                                                 
13 This finding is closely linked to our first argument for dollarization, the weak store of value function of the 
domestic currency. However, many other factors as financial infrastructure, legal and political environment might 
play a role. 
14 In this context, the current effort to prepare the first float of Vietnamese sovereign dollar bonds is questionable as 
it will further contribute to the dollarization of the Vietnamese economy, and increase foreign exchange exposure. In 
other words, while the State Bank of Vietnam has been trying for some years to reduce the degree of dollarization in 
the banking system, the prospective issue of a dollar-denominated sovereign bond will pull the country in the 
opposite direction and contribute to dollarization. This is also surprising as Vietnam, with a positive balance of 
payments, is not in need for an additional inflow of U.S. dollars.   11















































Source: Monetary Survey, SBV 
 
Graph 1 plots the development of dollarization of the Vietnamese banking system from 
1988 to 2003. Two factors contributed mainly to the dollarization process; first, the failed 
monetary reform in fall 1985 with the consequences of dramatic increases in inflation and 
depreciation of the Vietnamese Dong (VND) against the dollar until end of 1991 (Graphs 2 and 
3). The low quality of VND as store of value forced savers into alternative assets, gold and with 
the opening of the economy also U.S. dollars. The low quality of VND but also the perceived 
instability of the bank system is reflected in the short duration of deposits of less than one year in 
average. The stabilization of the Vietnamese price level and the nominal exchange rate of the 
U.S. dollar caused a reversion of the currency substitution process. Inflation rates are single digit 
and very modest since 1996. Strict capital controls helped to stabilize the nominal exchange rate 
against the U.S. dollar. The peg against the U.S. dollar around a very small margin of around 2.5   12
percent a year made the exchange rate development predictable. The shockwaves of the Asian 
financial crisis and the subsequent depreciation of the VND fuelled again dollarization. 
However, since 2001 dollarization in Vietnam is again on a downward trend with currently 
slightly above 20 percent of bank deposits. The  
 









































Source: GSO   13





































The flight into the better quality money, driven by its superiority as store of value, was 
spurred by the decision in 1988 to allow banks accepting deposits in foreign currency and paying 
interest rates on them. This argument applies strictly for a country like Vietnam with tight capital 
controls where investment abroad is no option. The arbitrage condition for holding VND or U.S. 
dollars changes into: 










where P is the Vietnamese price level in Vietnam and e
e is the expected change of the 
VND/USD rate.
15 The payment of interest rates on U.S. dollar deposits in the Vietnamese 
banking systems increases the attractiveness of U.S. dollar holdings. The reason behind the 
decision of the monetary authorities to allow U.S. dollar deposits was the low level and the low 
growth rate of deposits in VND. In addition, foreign exchange, when hoarded by the public is not 
available for financial intermediation for an economy with desperate need for foreign currency. 
                                                 
15 Note that a change in P itself does not cause portfolio decisions. A higher inflation rate relative to the US 
produces a fear of future depreciation of VND and increases e
e.   14
Applying our definitions, the limited ability to borrow domestically and abroad in domestic 
currency was causal for the dollarization of the Vietnamese economy.  
 
Graph 4: Financial Deepening in Viet Nam 
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Source: Monetary Survey, SBV, own calculations 
 
Graph 4 shows the development of financial deepening (M2VND+USD/GDP) since 1992.
16 
While this ratio has values above one for developed economies Vietnam’s financial deepening 
started in the early 1990s from levels below 30 percent. Over the last decade financial deepening 
has increased to almost 70 percent. 
In this section we showed that the main cause of the dollarization of the Vietnamese 
economy was the low quality of the domestic currency as medium to store value. With the 
ongoing stabilization of the VND dollarization came to a stop and could be even partly reversed. 
 
                                                 
16 Monetary data before 1992 are not very reliable.   15
4. The Use of U.S. dollars in a Dollarized Economy and its Dynamics 
While dollarization of bank deposits indisputably helps to increase financial deepening it 
comes with a considerable increase of risk for the financial system.
17 The open question is: what 
to do with all these dollars? 
For Viet Nam it is important to note that although dollarization of bank deposits might 
have a positive effect on financial deepening, both U.S. dollar and VND deposits have short 
maturities of one year or less. Hence, the problem of short term maturity of bank deposits and 
other sources of funds remains unsolved.  
The main argument against a dual currency regime is that it raises currency and default 
risk through currency mismatches. Vietnamese banks have basically three options for the use of 
dollars in their balance sheets: investing abroad, selling to the central bank, or giving domestic 
loans in U.S. dollars. 
First, they can deposit U.S. dollars abroad; this is the safest way since it does not give rise 
to currency mismatches. U.S. dollar dominated liabilities correspond with assets denominated in 
the same currency. Yet, banks might face an interest rate risk exists if a positive duration in 
dollar assets and liabilities exists. However, by keeping the U.S. dollars abroad they don’t serve 
within the Vietnamese financial intermediation and ridicule the financial deepening argument. 
The conclusion is: only if imported foreign currency is exported and held in form of deposits or 
bonds, risk can be avoided. Vietnamese bank deposits abroad peaked early 2002 with almost $ 5 
billion deposits abroad.  
From a welfare viewpoint the immediate export of foreign currency inflows should be 
suboptimal as borrowing rates should exceed lending rates. However, this does not apply for 
Vietnam; strict capital controls allowed banks to offer lower than world market interest rates for 
domestic U.S. dollar deposits and constitute a positive margin against their holdings abroad, 
mainly in Singapore and Hong Kong. The macroeconomic effect of this is a redistribution of 
wealth from domestic dollar depositors to banks; it is a capital control tax to the benefit of 
domestic banks, particularly State Owned Banks (SOCBs). 
                                                 
17 See for example Nicolo, G.D., Honohan, P. and A. Ize (2003)    16
The sharp decrease in U.S. dollar interest rate since 2002, though, reduced the spread for 
banks and made such an investment less attractive. Consequently, banks called outstanding 
deposits back home and deposit volume abroad halved until end of 2003.  
The second option is for banks to sell dollars to the central bank, the State Bank Viet 
Nam. Indeed, purchase of foreign currency by the Vietnamese central bank has been the single 
most important source of money supply since several years. The sale of dollars produces a 
currency mismatch in banks’ balance sheets. In case of dollar deposit withdrawals banks must 
have the guarantee of getting access to the central bank’s international reserve. In case of a 
devaluation of VND against the dollar either the banks take the hit, or the central bank 
compensates them by selling dollar to banks to the previous exchange rate. Note that foreign 
exchange reserves by central banks are another form of capital export. By doing so and 
promising banks the possibility of repurchase of foreign exchange to historic values the central 
bank implicitly hedges the banks’ currency mismatch.  
It is no coincident that central banks in Asia have accumulated significant net foreign 
exchange reserves.
18. With foreign net reserves of roughly 20 percent of GDP also the 
Vietnamese central bank is no exception. 
Finally, banks might lend in dollars to local firms and individuals. In 2003 foreign 
currency lending ballooned by 41 percent in Vietnam. In spring 2004, domestic loan volume in 
USD dollars already exceeds 28 percent. While banks formally avoid a currency mismatch of 
their assets / liabilities the default risk of banks’ loan portfolio dramatically increases as the 
exchange rate risk is outsourced to the final borrower. As these domestic borrowers 
overwhelmingly receive revenues in VND while the loans are denominated in U.S. dollars, they 
are exposed to changes of the dong/dollar exchange rate without having instruments to hedge this 
risk. More precisely, the relationship between net foreign currency liabilities and the net present 
value of a domestic currency denominated cash flow will change when the exchange rate 
changes. Only under the extreme assumption that the firm’s realized output prices change one to 
one with the depreciation of the domestic currency an increased default risk of the firm can be 
                                                 
18 China has U.S. dollar 439 Bio. foreign reserves, Hon Kong 122.1 Bio., India 113 Bio., Indonesia 36 Bio., 
Malaysia 53.4 Bio., Philippines 13.4 Bio., South Korea 163.6 Bio., Taiwan 227.7 Bio., and Thailand 41.9 Bio. The 
Economist, June 2004.   17
avoided.
19  Vietnamese banks are simply exchanging currency risk for default risk without 
properly pricing this risk. 
For Vietnam as a country, consolidating foreign currency assets and liabilities of its 
residents allows us to derive the aggregate currency mismatch.
20 The consequences for Vietnam 
as a whole are not different to a single firm (Eichengreen et al. 2003, p.14): “real exchange rate 
depreciation that raises the value of a country’s external debt in terms of the value of its national 
output will create adverse balance-sheet effects”. 
As a consequence, Vietnam has to keep the exchange rate against the U.S. dollar stable. 
A sharp depreciation of the VND would cause an implosion of the domestic banking system plus 
important segments of the corporate sector.  
To make things worse, while domestic dollar based lending increases financial sector 
systemic risk it also fuels the process of dollarization by charging interest rates for those loans. 
Interest rate payments in foreign currency constitute an additional foreign currency demand and 
undermine the long-term stability of the domestic currency.
21  
Hence, an exogenous economic shock could have devastating effects for the Vietnamese 
financial system based on two currencies. A devaluation of the Chinese yuan, for example, 
would immediately put pressure on the VND to devalue as well. A significant devaluation would 
ultimately risk a collapse of the banking system. In other words, the current situation does not 
allow any considerable change of the VND/$ parity (devaluation) without jeopardizing the 
financial sector stability. The loss of the exchange rate as a monetary policy instrument might be 
even more harmful with the current tendency of a rising price level; an overvaluation of the VND 
without the possibility to correct it would cause significant welfare losses. Furthermore, this 
implicit conflict of interest exposes Vietnam to speculative attacks as soon as capital flows are 
liberalized. Hence, the Vietnamese economy is increasingly prone to speculative attacks. 
                                                 
19 See also Eichengreen at al. (2003), p. 13. 
20 This is precisely the link to McKinnon’s definition of direct and indirect dollarization, as borrowing in foreign 
currency abroad might, but not always has to produce a currency mismatch.  
21 Banks lend dollar denominated loans k and charge interest i$. The bank earns from the margin k(iL-iD) with iL 
being the lending rate and iD the deposit interest rate. The additional net demand of the economy for foreign 
currency is k(iL).   18
The current exchange rate might as well come under pressure when US interest rates pick 
up. Only if the VND interest rates are lifted even more an increase of domestic dollar demand 
might be avoidable. Also, as most domestic U.S. dollar denominated loans are constructed as 
floaters (SIBOR plus spread), the higher interest rates will raise borrowing costs and increase 
default risk. 
The master plan for the opening of the Vietnamese economy is outlined in the Bilateral 
Trade Agreement (BTA) with the US and serves as basis for the current WTO negotiations. 
Unavoidably, the capital account restrictions will have be to be removed within the coming five 
years. Consequently, exchange rate management will be much more difficult in the future while 
domestic dollar lending is long-term. In addition, speculation against the exchange rate parity 
will be simplified. 
As stated above, dollarization of banks balance sheets weakens the lender of last resort 
function of the central bank. While a run on domestic currency can always be responded by 
increasing liquidity, the elasticity of money supply in foreign currency is limited. Given the net 
foreign reserves, the State Bank of Vietnam could at present probably not stem a run on dollar 
denominated bank deposits. 
The banking system is more prone to bank panics and unforeseen withdrawals of foreign 
deposits; the opening up of the economy will force banks to price in accordingly this higher risk. 
The advantage of cheap dollar lending will disappear. To put it in other words, domestic dollar 
lending increases systemic bank risk and the exposure will increase in parallel with the opening 
of the Vietnamese economy. 
The sobering result of this analysis is that incomplete dollarization, including any 
borrowing in foreign currency that produces a currency mismatch, is futile; it does not support 
financial intermediation. The price to be paid for the questionable benefits of having foreign 
currency available is to put financial sector stability at risk. 
5. Scheme of Actions to Fight Dollarization 
Dollarization occurs when a country’s currency proves to be weak in its store of value 
function. However, not every weak currency country is directly dollarized. As stated before, the 
introduction of dollar deposits and also the quasi legalized domestic use of dollars certainly   19
fueled the dollarization process in Vietnam. In its current situation of incomplete dollarization, 
Viet Nam is in the worst of all possible worlds. To regain the exchange rate as an adjustment 
mechanism and to pursue a more independent monetary policy a de-dollarization of the 
Vietnamese economy , particularly of the banking system as a sine qua non.  
Once a country is dollarized, hysteresis effects make it difficult to reverse the process. As 
a common pattern, currency related portfolio decisions are very difficult to be overturned. In 
principle, monetary authorities have to strengthen the quality of the domestic currency and build 
a robust financial and legal infrastructure as a precondition to reverse dollarization. The final 
objective having the VND as the only legal tender of the economy implies dollar deposits in the 
banking system to be prohibited. However, as banks lend in dollars a sudden prohibit of dollar 
deposits is not feasible. Instead, a gradual approach is needed; business in dollars has to be made 
unattractive for banks.  
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Source: Monetary Survey, SBV 
 
As graphs 5 and 6 indicate, the degree of dollarization is sensitive to the rate of return on 
deposits denominated in domestic currency and the substituting currency. Graph 5 plots the 
widening interest rate gap between VND and dollar denominated deposits in Vietnam. Graph 6   20
ads the ex post devaluation of VND against dollars to calculate the definite ex post rate of return 
on deposits in both currencies.
22 As a result of higher returns on dong deposits investors 
gradually shifted out of dollar into VND denominated deposits. Dollarization is reversible. The 
degree of dollarization declined from above 31 percent to close to 23 percent end of 2003.  
 
Graph 6: 




























































where i-gap measures differences in nominal interest rates for both currencies, and the e-index the 
change of the exchange rate.  
Source: Monetary Survey, SBV, own calculations 
 
Additional measures have to be taken to accelerate this process. As a first step, dollar 
lending by banks should be limited to borrowers with dollar revenues to limit a currency 
mismatch. This is a second best solution taking into consideration that the dollarization of bank 
deposits can not be terminated straight away as banks have long-term dollar denominated loans 
                                                 
22 As mentioned above the current exchange rate regime with strict capital controls and a defined maximal yearly 
depreciation of VND against dollar is rather predictable.   21
in their portfolio. Still, the selection of potential dollar borrowers with revenues in the same 
currency aims to reduce the currency mismatch of borrowers. 
Second, interest ceilings for dollar deposits should be introduced in order to discourage 
dollar holdings; the envisaged effect is to motivate a further shift out of U.S. dollar denominated 
into VND deposits and a repatriation of U.S. dollars outside banks in circulation. For the latter, 
the use of foreign currency as means of payment and unit of account (pricing) should be strictly 
prohibited. As indirectly dollarized economies demonstrate the domestic use of dollars as quasi 
parallel currency can be effectively prevented. 
Finally, reserve requirements for dollar deposits should be raised to reduce the profit 
margin for banks doing dollar denominated business. It is crucial to reduce banks’ incentive to 
attract further U.S. dollar deposits. This measure, taken by the State Bank since 2001, has been 
proven to be very effective. 
With tight capital account restrictions in place it should be possible to reverse 
dollarization as the public has no legal way to earn legally interest on dollar savings outside the 
domestic banking system. The successful de-dollarization is a necessary precondition for a more 
flexible exchange rate regime. With the opening of the financial sector in the coming years and 
the liberalization of capital account transaction it will be much harder to achieve this objective. 
6. Conclusions 
The Vietnamese economy is not a promising candidate for a unilateral monetary 
unification with the U.S.; in other words, dollarization is not beneficial as basically all 
requirements derived from Optimal Currency Area literature are not in place.  
The reason why the Vietnamese economy is dollarized can be tracked back to the 
financial turmoil of the 1980s and the VND being a weak medium to store value and the decision 
by monetary authorities in 1988 to accept dollar denominated deposits in the domestic banking 
system. 
The current situation for Vietnam having two currencies that are used parallel in the 
economy is the worst of all worlds. Unavoidably, considerable currency mismatches occur 
within and outside the banking system. A significant devaluation of VND against dollar would 
jeopardize the entire financial system. The only way to avoid such a currency mismatch is to   22
keep dollars invested abroad. This, however, demonstrates the uselessness of dollarization for 
economic development. 
To reverse the process of dollarization the financial and legal infrastructure has to be 
improved; further, VND denominated assets should promise a higher rate of return than dollar 
denominated one. Finally, the use of dollar should increasingly be made unattractive for banks 
and customers. A successful de-dollarization is necessary given the foreseeable opening of the 
Vietnamese economy in the context of WTO.  
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